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A B S T R A C T
Narratives can help increase experiential engagement with climate change and build support for transitions to a
low carbon future. The UK’s 2050 climate targets provide indicatives frames through which emissions reductions
could be translated to diﬀerent contexts. The scenarios outlined in the UK’s ﬁfth carbon budget will require
lifestyle changes which may need to counter low levels of acceptance of the need to change through techno-
logical, political and behavioural initiatives. This paper explores the role of narratives of the UK’s ﬁfth carbon
budget in increasing engagement to climate change. Data are presented from thirty semi-structured interviews
with UK academic, policy and practitioner communities. Six narratives are identiﬁed that could enable positive
engagement with a low carbon future and better engagement on climate change: (i) showcasing investment
opportunities; (ii) maintaining independence and freedom of choice; (iii) guiding audiences to visualise a low
carbon future; (iv) demonstrating broader appeal, salience and impact of not doing anything; (v) supporting
transitions and change; (vi) highlighting beneﬁts to quality of life. Implications of these ﬁndings to public en-
gagement on climate change and perceptions of how life may need to be reconﬁgured in a low carbon future are
discussed.
1. The context of engagement on climate change in the United
Kingdom
The scientiﬁc imperative to act on climate change is mirrored by
increasing political ambition to limit global greenhouse gas emissions
and ensure global temperatures do not rise beyond 2 °C [1], whilst
“pursuing eﬀorts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C” [2]. The
UK passed its Climate Change Act in 2008 providing the world’s ﬁrst
legally binding framework which imposes UK-wide Greenhouse Gas
(GHG) emission targets of 80% reduction by 2050 over 1990 levels. The
Act required that the UK government set legally binding carbon bud-
gets, establish a Committee on Climate Change (CCC) as well as a Na-
tional Adaptation Programme (NAP) outlining the risks to the UK from
climate change [3]. These carbon budgets (Table 1) ensure the im-
plementation of the Act’s 2050 emissions targets [4] and in 2011, the
UK government released its Carbon Plan [5] outlining policies and
proposals to meet the fourth carbon budget; the overarching purpose
being to serve as a plan for a transition to a low carbon economy in the
future. In 2016, the UK government approved the CCC’s proposals for
the ﬁfth Carbon Budget to reduce GHG emissions in 2030 by 57% [6].
This forms a rich national government narrative on the need to act on
climate change although a lack of substantial drop in GHG emissions
questions the extent to which this narrative is eﬀective. There is argu-
ably a limited narrative which ties together this national imperative with
cross-government departmental focus on food, energy, transport, water,
health.
The UK’s 2050 targets provide indicatives frames through which
emissions reductions could be translated to diﬀerent societal contexts.
However, it is important to caveat that these are targets and hence it is
impossible to predict exactly what a 2030 UK would look like due to the
changes in economic, demographic, behavioural and other external
factors which could inﬂuence the way in which emission reductions
occur and change. Importantly, many of these changes may be an ex-
tension of the current ‘status quo’ with a number absorbed into social
and infrastructure ‘fabrics’ hence reducing their visibility.
Consequently, individuals may not be aware that the changes they are
making are a consequence of the need for emissions reductions nor is it
possible to predict with certainty that changes that occur, resulting in
GHG reductions, will be directly attributable to low-carbon initiatives.
This may be problematic considering the impact of perceived barriers
on development of sustainable technologies such as smart homes which
can facilitate societal shifts to low carbon solutions [7]. Indeed, tech-
nology such as smart meters generates both positive responses, in that it
can enable energy savings and accurate billing, and negative responses
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around privacy and mistrust of suppliers. Positive responses to en-
vironmental concerns and engagement around the concept of sustain-
able changes [8] are facilitated by utilising these types of technologies
that are more salient and enable consumers to engage with the concept
of low carbon initiatives.
Tools are being developed to increase engagement with the concept
of reducing personal carbon emissions and changes needed to reach
emissions targets. The 2050 Calculator, for example is such a tool de-
veloped by the UK’s Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC)
enabling experts and non-experts to ‘play’ with and negotiate diﬀerent
energy mixes and behavioural changes to assess ways of achieving an
80% reduction in GHG emissions [9]. In order for the UK and other
countries to take advantage of the opportunities associated with a low
carbon future, a level of engagement at the individual level is required,
and reliance on policy regulation alone is insuﬃcient. A core require-
ment to ensure this engagement and achieve the ﬁfth carbon budget
will be buy-in from consumers, speciﬁcally around energy eﬃciency in
buildings, driving a shift to low carbon forms of heating, continuing
eﬃciency improvement in vehicles, rolling out low-cost, low-carbon
power and supporting the development of emerging options such as
carbon capture and storage. A larger dependence on public engagement
and behavioural approaches is therefore needed through a process of
active participation (whether physical or in thought), where mediation
and co-production are actively constructed through this engagement
process, resulting from interactions between those involved in the
process: “The who (publics), what (issues), and how (procedural formats)
of participation do not externally exist in a natural state but are actively
constructed through the performance of collective participatory practices.”
[10,586]).
The UK public supports climate change mitigation [11] and de-
monstrates concern for energy security [12] with preference for de-
mand-side as opposed to supply-side options [13]. There is public ap-
petite for action on climate change and reduction in carbon emissions
as evidenced by research on public engagement on the fourth carbon
budget [14], which demonstrated a general sense of pride in the UK’s
leading role in this space, and acknowledgement of the need for be-
haviour change at the individual and household levels. The most ap-
prehension, however, appears to be around the perceived cost of
measures to address climate change and perceived trust towards new,
less-tested technologies, and narratives could be most eﬀective in ad-
dressing this. The scenarios outlined in the ﬁfth carbon budget will
require behavioural and lifestyle changes which may need to counter
low levels of acceptance [15,16] and indeed framing this in a positive
and inclusive manner may further increase engagement to the issue
making it a social reality.
2. Using narratives to engage with society on low carbon futures
Individuals ﬁlter information (on climate change) based on their
cultural and political viewpoints, weighing the risks of climate change
with solutions available [17]. An over-reliance on a linear ﬂow of in-
formation [18] where a ‘problem’ and ‘solution’ approach is adopted
[19] and where it is assumed that providing information about the issue
(e.g. climate change) will therefore be suﬃcient to lead to a solution to
alleviate its impacts (e.g. reduce greenhouse gas emissions through
behavioural changes). This model fails to fully consider the complex-
ities and intricacies of social and cultural elements that aﬀect in-
formation acquisition, the evidence-decision making ‘interface’, and
that knowing more about the science of an issue will not necessarily
increase understanding or lead to action [20]. It has been suggested
that rather than ﬁxating on gaps in knowledge or indeed polarised ar-
guments, that a focus on overlaps in perceptions and motivations to
engage with the issue would enable constructive dialogue and deeper
understanding of its intricacies and opportunities for societal shifts
[21]. Work by Shove addresses some of the complexities of informing
sustainability-related decision-making processes, the importance of
going beyond information and the need to consider the impact of atti-
tudes and values that drive behavioural traits and how these are im-
pacted by the context within which they are constructed and applied
[22]. Furthermore the complexities of the multiple disciplines that can
help inform this process and shed light as to how better communication
of climate change may increase its eﬃciency, are vast and should not be
neglected. The context within which communication on climate change
occurs is important as the nature of and the way methods are used to
engage audiences will go beyond the impact of content and aﬀect how
communication is received, perceived and acted upon (or not).
This linear approach, whilst recognised as being limited in engaging
the public on the issue, is to some extent the process by which scientiﬁc
evidence informs policy making, and hence an assumption that a si-
milar process would work with the public is not surprising. However
this has important implications to decision-making and support for or
against particular policies because ‘if an individual’s level of scientiﬁc
knowledge predicts one’s risk perceptions, and risk perceptions predict
policy preferences, which can then inﬂuence the behaviour of policy
actors, then the public’s understanding of these complex issues becomes
a lynchpin to the policy process’ [23]. Deeper engagement is therefore
needed, above information dissemination, with the individual, to re-
frame attitudes or behaviours and enable eﬃcient transitions to low
carbon lifestyles. However, as discussed above, people’s values, the
degree of trust in the messenger and the context within which decisions
are made inﬂuence people’s preference for certain policies. The per-
ceptions of climate change and associated risks are therefore much
more complex in nature [12] and call for insights from across dis-
ciplines. Behavioural decision research, for example, emphasises the
importance of context by measuring values and preferences of people
when they are dealing with something unfamiliar [24]; Lichtenstein
and Slovic, 2006, cited in [12].
Cox [25] makes a good case for scholars working on environmental
communication to consider the distinction between mobilizing on cli-
mate change and encouraging mobilization that provides a means to an
end. An understanding of the policy context is thus required to ensure
an alignment with environmental communication approaches to better
engage and mobilise publics. However ‘much of the scholarship in this
area has focused on the discursive representations, framing, and per-
ceptions of climate change itself and its seriousness, rather than the
relationships among speciﬁc communicative eﬀorts (e.g. framing) and
their strategic or consequential potential within the economic, political,
and ideological systems in which energy policy is embedded’ [25,123]).
Whereas, Daniels and Endﬁeld [26], in their summation of narratives of
climate change, suggest that the method in which people receive, in-
terpret and understand information on climate change, particularly of
its ‘dangerous’ nature, aﬀects resulting actions. People often produce
their own stories of climate change such as how they feel about it, how
it may have aﬀected them, how they personally respond to it, providing
a window into personal experiences and self-reﬂection [27]. Such an
approach where storytelling enables ‘individuals [to] re-work and order
experience, evaluate events and construct meaning and knowledge’
[28,p. 1086]) enables scientiﬁc data to be considered in the context of
the individual's own story as opposed to considered in isolation with
little context. Narratives enable the construction of a coherent message
on climate change, and are better constructed from dialogues, where
Table 1
The UK’s carbon budgets.
Budget Period Level (MtCO2e) % ↘ below base year
1st 2008–2012 3018 23%
2nd 2013–2017 2782 29%
3rd 2018–2022 2544 35% by 2020
4th 2023–2027 1950 50% by 2025
5th 2028–2032 1765 61% by 2030
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there is a teller and a listener, and where communication through a
personalised every day lens oﬀers the opportunity for social change.
The production of such narratives must be, according to Bushell et al.
[29], ‘seen as an iterative, engaging process of dialogues, not just a
single, linear process with a set of objectives and a narrative that is then
broadcast to the public’.
The way climate change is framed, therefore, has a profound impact
on how it is perceived (and the way it is perceived may also impact the
way it is framed), and engagement may increase if the message is
framed to sub-groups of a population who may share similar values,
beliefs and world views [30]. For example, framing the co-beneﬁts of
climate change and low carbon transitions through health, well-being
[31,32] and energy security [33] lenses can increase engagement on the
issue. Adopting such an approach which explores people’s values and
how they relate to climate change and carbon emissions may therefore
provide an eﬀective way of increasing engagement. There are a number
of ways in which narratives can be constructed depending on the issue
in question, the purpose of the narrative and the audience-messenger
interface. However analysing narrative construction is not the focus of
this paper as there have been a number of persuasive accounts of the
role of narratives. For example, Throgmorton [34] compares narratives
to planning where future-oriented texts and carefully chosen language
are used to enable audiences to see a planned future as desirable, and
Janda and Topouzi [35] discuss how in the context of energy, story-
telling is generally conducted through telling ‘hero stories’, ‘learning
stories’ or ‘horror stories’. Recognition of the role of narratives as me-
chanisms to inform awareness and decision making is reﬂected not only
in research discussed in this paper but also in the growth of work in this
space. For example, in the UK, the Imperial College Grantham Institute
hosted a roundtable on climate change strategic narratives1 as did the
Leeds Social Sciences Institute on exploring narrative in policy and
policy analysis2 in January 2017.
Narratives are used in a variety of disciplines [36] as a mechanism
for telling stories on issues which may be diﬃcult to engage with and
provide useful mechanism through which to link them to an audience’s
social reality [37]. There is no single deﬁnition of narratives but key
characteristics have been identiﬁed in the literature (Table 2). They are
useful tools and indeed politicians use narratives to engage with their
constituents [42], teachers adopt learning narratives in their teaching
methods [43] and enable a deeper connection between theoretical and
experiential experiences [44]. Narratives are used to enable socio-
technical transitions [45] and artists utilise them in their work to fa-
cilitate deeper engagement with diﬀerent audiences [38] enabling a
better understanding of the personalised perceptions of climate change
and the role of emotion and logic in engaging individuals with issues of
climate change [46]. They enable the framing of complex and chal-
lenging societal issues such as climate change, in a way that aligns and
resonates with the values receiving these stories and makes climate
change more tangible [47]. In particular, narratives can help with
‘understanding the role of stakeholders and what drives them […] when
making policy predictions and implementing strategies’ and can pro-
vide additional support for explaining ‘unintended consequences in
policy/initiative outcomes’ and may help in testing ‘the ethical nature
of predictions in policy formulation and evaluation’ [35,529]).
Historically, climate change has been communicated primarily
through the use of science-heavy data of facts and ﬁgures to help inform
policy making, and whilst this provides useful anchors to communicate
complex information, they are not known for their widespread success
in delivering a compelling argument to act on climate change to those,
such as the public, who are not data-inclined [48]. Indeed analysis of
the way in which complex climate science information in the Inter-
governmental Panel on Climate Change Fifth Assessment report, re-
vealed that the Summary for Policy Makers, intended to be understood
by non-experts, required readers to have a good understanding of sci-
entiﬁc knowledge in order to fully grasp the content and its applications
[49]. The process of developing and using narratives could help as it is a
common learning and teaching approach, as explained by Clark [43,3]
“we make sense of all experience by narrating it (constructing it as a
kind of story)” and thus adopting this approach is growing in popularity
in climate change communication [50,21]. Salience to climate change
could be increased, highlighting the link between local impacts of cli-
mate change (such as weather events) which may have an impact on the
public’s construction of narratives and mental models of evidence. This
would enable deeper engagement, increased concern and action on
climate change [51], particularly so if narratives are framed around
local relevance and place attachment [52].
The use of narratives can help overcome perceived barriers to
change [15] and bridge the gap between what is referred to as the
transmission approach (a linear process of information dissemination
clearly distinguishing between a ‘sender’ and ‘receiver’ of information,
with limited public involvement) and the participatory approach
(multi-directional process of dialogue between sender and receiver, and
with extensive public involvement) [53]. Narratives can enable a better
appreciation of the audience’s interpretation of a message and better
incorporation of the context of communication (often kept separate
from communication through the transmission approach) whilst an-
ticipating potential misinterpretation of communication and delayed
decision making processes (recognised as weaknesses of a participatory
approach). In addition, Spence and Pidgeon [54] found that positive
engagement with climate change was found to occur when participants
were asked to consider the social impacts of climate change as opposed
to personal ones. A survey of the UK public assessed what people value
the most in life with a focus on compassionate values such as ‘help-
fulness’, ‘equality’ and ‘protection of nature’ as well as selﬁsh values
including ‘wealth’, ‘public image’ and ‘success’ [55]. Close to three
quarters (74%) of people considered compassionate values to be more
important than selﬁsh ones. This was found to be particularly true
amongst individuals who demonstrated low feelings of inclusivity, who
felt less positive about being involved with others, who experienced
greater social alienation, and who were less likely to feel like they ﬁt in
with wider society. This suggests that increasing feelings of inclusive-
ness and positivity may reduce disengagement from the issue. Similarly,
Demski et al. [56] identify a set of core values which ‘represent iden-
tiﬁable cultural resources people draw on to guide their preference
formation’ (59) and that by focusing on these values when designing
communication approaches could lead to more constructive dialogue
and decision making. These are important to consider when advancing
climate communication and utilising narratives to increase engagement
as this research suggests that moving away from personal impacts and
broadening this out to the social scale may still enable salience to the
issue whilst facilitating constructive engagement.
3. Approach
This paper assesses the role of narratives in increasing public en-
gagement to climate change where we explore how narratives framed
around a positive vision of a low carbon future could enable more
constructive public dialogue on climate change. This is discussed in the
context of the UK’s ﬁfth carbon budget, a particularly relevant and
salient piece of legislation that will impact the UK’s path towards a low
carbon economy. In addition we consider this in the context of audi-
ences who might feel less inclined to respond favourably to such data.
The current state of play on increasing public understanding of climate
change and public engagement on low carbon transitions informed a
thematic approach to this research by exploring: (i) societal responses
and needs to a low carbon future, (ii) framing a low carbon future, and
1 https://www.imperial.ac.uk/grantham/publications/brieﬁng-papers/towards-a-
unifying-narrative-for-climate-change-grantham-brieﬁng-paper-18.php.
2 http://www.lssi.leeds.ac.uk/events/narrating-policy-exploring-narrative-in-policy-
and-policy-analysis/.
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(iii) framing a low carbon future as positive and desirable.
Thirty semi-structured interviews were carried out with individuals
working in academia (n = 10, labelled as ‘aca’ in the discussion), policy
(n = 10, labelled as ‘pol’) and practitioner organisations (n = 10, la-
belled as ‘pract’) in the UK, selected based on their knowledge and
experience of climate policy, emissions reductions initiatives and con-
structive mechanisms to engage the public. Organisations represented
by interviewees included universities, UK local and national govern-
ment departments, city-based climate initiatives, consultancies and
climate media/communications agencies. Interviewees were from a
range of backgrounds and expertise with specialisms including climate
science, UK carbon budgets, public engagement, behavioural science,
climate policy, with varying levels of seniority to ensure a re-
presentative sample. Interviewees were asked a series of questions
about how to engage audiences on the UK’s ﬁfth carbon budget, how
this relates to people’s day to day lives, low carbon transitions and how
engagement on this could be framed more positively. Interviews con-
sisting of 10 questions under the three themes outlined above (Table 3),
were conducted in the UK with scripts developed and piloted before-
hand. The study received ethics approval by the Anglia Ruskin Uni-
versity Psychology Departmental Research Ethics Panel (DREP) and
ratiﬁed by the Faculty Research Ethics Panel under the terms of Anglia
Ruskin University’s Policy and Code of Practice for the Conduct of
Research with Human Participants.
Interviewees were recruited by adopting a snowball methodology,
with interviewees identiﬁed based on an evidence review as well as
building on the networks and knowledge of the sector and assessing
additional suggestions of other experts to approach made by the in-
terviewees. Each interview lasted between 30 min and one hour, was
audio-recorded and data was transcribed and analysed using discourse
analysis via the software NVivo. Final interview transcripts were sent to
interviewees for review and quality assurance and responses were kept
conﬁdential and made anonymous to encourage a frank discussion of
positions and to protect personal privacy. A thematic discourse analysis
was conducted on the data to draw out prominent themes discussed
with the interviewees.
While the sample size (n = 30) and geographic representation of
the participants (i.e. UK) necessitates caveats with regards to the re-
presentation of the ﬁndings and suggests the need for further research
with larger sample sizes and representation from diﬀerent geographical
and sectorial populations, data from these interviews nonetheless pro-
vide valuable insights into how to frame a 2030 future as positive and
desirable and reduce perceived barriers to such a future.
4. Results and discussion
Analysis of interview data revealed six dominant narratives that
participants stated would be most eﬀective in engaging the public,
particularly individuals who may be less inclined to want to change
their behaviour, on the concept of a low carbon future. Framing these
narratives in a positive way would further ensure greater salience and
sustained engagement in the longer term.
4.1. Investment, wealth, cost
A dominant narrative that emerged was that a low carbon future
could provide investment opportunities to individuals. This was felt to
be particularly eﬀective in engaging a less engaged subgroup of the
population who are more likely to seek personal gain from any changes
they felt they may need to endure in a low carbon future. This was felt
Table 2
Deﬁnition and characteristics of narratives (from selected sources).
Deﬁnition and characteristics of narratives Source
“An account of a series of events, facts, etc., given in order and with the establishing of connections between them; a narration, a story, an
account.”
Oxford English Dictionary
“Stories of this form often have a beginning, middle, and end: an introduction to the situation, a series of events often involving tension or
conﬂict, and a resolution.”
“While stories often concern interacting characters, they may also present a sequence of facts and observations linked together by a
unifying theme or argument.”
Segel and Heer [38:1]
Strategic narrative: “a dynamic and persuasive system of stories, originally generated and encouraged between government, business and
civil society”
“The development of a strategic narrative is a unifying concept, an umbrella under which the incredible diversity of literature and
projects that aim to inspire further action on climate change can be uniﬁed, bringing them together into a cohesive, coordinated and
eﬀective message.”
Bushell et al. [7]
“Organise a sequence of events into a whole so that the signiﬁcance of each event can be understood through its relation to that whole. In
this way a narrative conveys the meaning of events”
Elliot [39]
“discourses with a clear sequential order that connect events in a meaningful way for a deﬁnite audience and thus oﬀer insights about the
world and/or people’s experiences of it”
Hinchman and Hinchman [40,xvi]
“each narrative has a setting, characters, and a solution to the problem of climate change” Jones [60,8]
Narratives have a setting, a plot (beginning, middle, end), characters (heroes, villains and victims), and the moral of the story Jones and McBeth [36]
“visual ‘hooks’ on which to hang news reports”
“narratives connect political debate about problems and solutions with media users’ experiences and identities by oﬀering enduring
symbolic systems”
Wozniak et al. [41,470 & 471]
Table 3
Themes and interview questions.
Theme Question
Societal responses and needs to a low carbon
future in 2030
• Thinking of the year 2030, what does a low carbon future mean for society?• What are the main opportunities that emerge for society from such a future?• What are the main challenges/blockages/barriers that emerge for society from such a future?
Framing of a low carbon future in 2030 • Do you think that the ways we have been talking about this (as a transition, a low carbon future, climate mitigation) are
eﬀective for a mainstream or sceptical audience?
• [How else] could we eﬀectively frame these changes?• How would people respond to changes needed in 2030?
Frame a low carbon future as favourable and
desirable
• In what ways would a low carbon future validate and reinforce the qualities of life that people currently value most, or
even restore the qualities they fear we might be losing?
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to be a clear way of appealing directly to their values and help over-
come perceived negative feelings towards the need to change con-
sumption patterns by demonstrating the ﬁnancial beneﬁts of doing so.
Ultimately, whilst change is needed and this may be costly, framing this
as a beneﬁt in the long term (even if short term costs are incurred), or as
an investment into one’s future, may prove more beneﬁcial than simply
demonstrating the ﬁnancial gains with no time frame associated.
“Just plain old investment opportunities, you know? Investment in dif-
ferent types of energy and diﬀerent types of technology. The challenge, I
guess, with the low-carbon future, is the narrative around reducing
consumption because if you reduce consumption, that necessarily has
implications for your mode of society, your economy.” (Aca8)
Similarly, communicating certain incentives associated with a low
carbon future, such as ﬁnancial gains, without providing actual eco-
nomic incentives, may prolong a desire to invest, ﬁnancially or other-
wise, in a low carbon 2030. This may overcome the limits of the in-
formation deﬁcit approach and bypass the ‘need’ to seek to alter
attitudes, understanding and awareness (of the need for change and the
case for a low carbon future). If these beneﬁts are visible (with inter-
viewees emphasising that these do not need to be about low carbon or
sustainability) and framed appropriately, then the public should be able
to decide the most proﬁtable situation they can create for themselves.
“If the circumstances changed, so that it were a ﬁnancially attractive
proposition, and not too much of a hassle practically” (Aca2)
“I think that provided the net beneﬁt is there, then sometimes you
don't necessarily have to win over hearts and minds ﬁrst. They'll just
follow the behaviour” (Pol5)
4.2. Maintaining independence and freedom of choice
Interviewees referred to a fear that tends to emerge when engaging
the public on the need for transitioning to a low carbon future which is
that of the threat of, or perceived threat of, a loss of choice of options
and freedom to make these choices. A low carbon future is, at times,
understood to imply a considerable reduction in the range of options
that will be available to people and suggests a deliberate removal of
choices from people, with the perception of the government or big
businesses taking control over decisions that are felt should remain with
the individual.
“Well it would simply mean that people ﬁnd themselves with new options,
some of which they will have little control over. And some of which they
will have some choice. So I suppose appliances and behaviors might have
changed a bit.” (Aca2)
“They don’t want government out all-together but they want government
playing an appropriate role and not being too present in their lives and
therefore have more control over one’s own destiny and I think that’s why
it’s important in terms of society, I think that choice. And it’s forward
looking about the future, you know, choosing a better life or choosing a
better future, I think that’s the kind of spirit you want to try and convey
to them.” (Pract7)
A low carbon future would provide a new and diﬀerent type of
freedom which in itself may be diﬃcult to envisage or visualise in the
short term. New options will be required to achieve the ﬁfth carbon
budget (for example through new technology as described in Section 1),
possibly reducing the overall amount of decisions that need to be made
by people, whilst ensuring the range of options available still provide
the best range from which individuals can form their own decisions. In
terms of energy generation and use, for example, a low carbon 2030 is
expected to have a more electriﬁed energy market with greater range of
freedom for consumers to choose where their energy is sourced (e.g.
from renewable sources, or local community initiatives). Maintaining a
similar level of freedom to make one’s own choices alongside the
introduction of smart technology to facilitate decisions (e.g. remote
home heating controls) were considered fundamental to building a
positive framing of a low carbon future
“Freedom to make your own choices, and beneﬁt.” (Aca2)
“Encourage them to buy a diﬀerent kind of car, heat their home in a
diﬀerent way, see that it's very sensible to really transformed the way we
generate electricity in the country. I think the issue is … the time scale
dictates that you can’t just wait for a sort of generational change. I think
there’s quite good argument that the next generation of conservatives will
be wholly bought into large parts of this agenda in a way that our age and
up generation may not be.” (Pol2)
Preserving independence was a strong narrative that emerged from
the interviews, and one which is constantly sought to be preserved,
which emerges as key to minimise disengagement from climate change
and a low carbon future. Low carbon technology is not always con-
sidered to be appealing and discussing the changes needed under a
2030 low carbon UK may have more appeal if framed in the general
context of sustainability (moving away from environmental sustain-
ability as a primary frame) towards sustainable independence and the
beneﬁts this brings.
“You’re moving towards more acceptable when you talk about sustain-
ability, but when you take it in its pure meaning, not this green language.
Sustainability in that, if my house was sustainable, then I would be in-
dependent. You know? I wouldn't need to rely on anyone, and that would
be great if it worked.” (Pol5)
“This is not about constricting vintage freedoms, this is about giving
people the opportunity to use their resources more eﬃciently.” (Pract10)
4.3. Visualising the future
All interviewees expressed how challenging it was to visualise a
2030 future, let alone a low carbon one. Similarly they felt that re-
ﬂections in the future on what a past world had looked like were even
more challenging and less likely to occur. A way in which to overcome
and enable greater engagement and salience was thought to be through
highlighting the possible future and the range of possible alternatives that
may occur.
“You have to ﬁrst ask them, and then even the answer that they will give
about some hypothetical future is not how they will really react because
they will not be able to predict it themselves.” (Aca1)
This would also work both in terms of framing and visualising the
impacts of climate change that may manifest in a 2030 world just as
much as the mitigation approaches needed to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions that exacerbate these impacts. Changes that may be needed
to adapt to climate change may therefore also align well (or indeed
conﬂict) with changes required to adjust to the requirements of a lower
carbon world; interviewees felt that opportunities to highlight this
should not be neglected in narrative development.
“There would be beneﬁts possibly around, you know, transitioning to
cheaper sources of fuel, or giving them more autonomy around that.”
(Pract2)
“On that time frame, by 2030, so there’s two diﬀerent things that are
going on. One is that on that time frame, you know, what climate impacts
are we going to be seeing, that we haven’t already seen? But the other one
is, what [are the] changes in people’s lives, on that time frame? It’s likely
to be quite traumatic, and certainly much more dramatic than people
have really internalized.” (Aca7)
C. Howarth Energy Research & Social Science xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx
5
4.4. Broader appeal, salience and impact of not doing anything
Whilst a low carbon future in 2030 may be diﬃcult to visualise,
creating a narrative that increases salience to changes that will be re-
quired, bringing it home to people, how these may entail little rather
than large changes, and how these align with existing lifestyles may
further enable deeper engagement from people. For example, demon-
strating how changes needed are and will be logical, will essentially
align with existing and evolving needs of individuals. Building this
narrative would increase salience towards trends in lifestyles and be-
haviours that make sense and ﬁt within individual’s lifestyles, further
helping to normalize the lifestyle shifts needed.
“I think perhaps, something to do with normalizing things would be
helpful, so things not feeling like they’re particularly radical, but that
they are sensible and logical, and they’re the solutions that need to be
found, and that they’re not coming from an agenda. They’re not from an
opinionated viewpoint or a green or a left agenda. It's just sensible, logical
steps based on evidence.” (Pract3)
“I think, make it more about people’s day to day lives. I think that, that's
been missing from the conversation.” (Aca5)
“I think of actually kind of bringing it home to people, (…) making it real
to them.” (Pol3)
Such a salient narrative would broaden out to a wider appeal of
enacting initiatives than enable a shift to a low carbon future. In doing
so a greater connection between individuals and climate change would
highlight the implications of not adopting changes required. The
broader impacts, in terms of beneﬁts and convenience for example
would, as a result, become more apparent and lead to sustained changes
in the long run.
“I think the idea of not wasting energy, of not buying more stuﬀ than you
need. Of taking care of your local environment, not having, totally
congested, urbanized areas, is one that resonates with them.” (Pol2)
“.their lives, so their communities, their towns, their villages and cities
and what it would mean for their lifestyle and their groups, whatever
social group they ﬁt in’s lifestyle” (Pol3)
“Cost, convenience possibly because I don’t think that the convenient
solutions are being created, you know, the technological leaps that means
that actually greener living is going to be really quite pleasant. I don’t
think that case has been made yet.” (Pol5)
Showing what a high carbon world might look like could be an ef-
fective method of overcoming resistance to change, if managed tact-
fully. By addressing fears associated with change and providing nar-
ratives on lower uncertainty about the future, a more secure future due
to more eﬃcient and sustainable options would enable individuals to
understand where they still have choices to make.
“So, a low-carbon society, the beneﬁts being around clean, healthy en-
vironment to live, work, enjoy. I think for that audience in particular,
perhaps emphasizing the beneﬁts to the countryside, and to the land-
scape, and to the more conservation elements of what a low carbon so-
ciety could bring or what the opposite for low-carbon society wouldn’t
enable. So, if we’re not to go down that route, then what the ﬂip-side
would be and how unappealing that would be.” (Pract3)
“It would be that, painting a very clear, secure future and we have a plan
to get to this point; um, that it is feasible and doable. Um, and that, it’s a
positive thing to get there, rather than a scary thing.” (Aca8)
4.5. Preserving the status quo/less change
Many of the interviews highlighted the prevalence of general re-
sistance to change within people’s lives, regardless of personal values
and political views, required under a 2030 low carbon UK. This is
further likely to increase disengagement due to the perception for the
need for signiﬁcant, disruptive and unappealing changes to one’s life-
style. As interviewees revealed, however, persevering and maintaining
engagement through demonstrating the broader social beneﬁts of
change (moving away from low carbon frames) could help address
perceived barriers to change and enable individuals to understand
changes required may not be as large as they expect.
“I think there would be more appreciation of the social beneﬁts at hand
by moving to a low-carbon future that was devolved in that way, but
you’ll also have a segment of society who have no interest at all, and
you'll actually … you're going to be forcing them to consider these
things.” (Pol5)
“If they choose to be disengaged, they don’t want to be engaged, and
you’re saying, well, this is actually going to impact your life very little
and you just introduce it” (Pol5)
As discussed above, a 2030 low carbon world will require changes
in terms of emission reductions and adaptation to impacts of climate
change ultimately to help maintain current standards of living, there-
fore disengagement could dissipate and provide an opportunity to en-
gage on the positive and beneﬁcial elements of a low carbon 2030. This
could mean that a change taking place in one area (e.g. adoption of a
new technology) may open doors to change others; and changes re-
quired under a changing climate and low carbon world may take place
even for non-low-carbon reasons.
“So, you could argue anything that hints at change or transition, however
you couch it, could to some audiences, possibly [who] by their own
nature, they’re conservative, they want to make things stay the same.”
(Pract6)
“It could be it’s about preserving the aspects of ways of life that people
like and they’re familiar with and perhaps highlighting how things could
change in the future in a positive context as well that could be of things
that they value personally, whether that’s, you know, their homes, the
kind of episodes of winter ﬂooding is highlighted vulnerability in certain
communities and an Englishman's home is his castle etc so appealing on
that front could be an issue” (Pol1)
“So I guess there might be an angle there, uh, because if you’re worried
about external threats to a great degree, then you might be more inter-
ested in creating a self-sustaining environment.” (Pol5)
Providing aspirational frames and narratives through which to
communicate may further increase the appeal of a low carbon future
and demonstrate how this can align with the status quo, thereby alle-
viating fears and unease about the need for change. Change, inter-
viewees stated, could also be good, however rarely is this considered to
be the case in reality. Whilst visioning 2030 may be a slight challenge,
reﬂection on how transitions have occurred in the past and how in-
dividuals responded to this (i.e. whether these were out of necessity or
inadvertent) may enable deeper engagement with the process of change
and further reduce resistance to this.
“I think the beneﬁts could be around the smarter ways of doing things,
and I think it would need to somehow tap into the aspirational qualities
that might appeal …” (Pract3)
“Well, I guess that we’ve been trying to think about how transitions
happened in the past. I don’t think it's about, say, trying to predict the
future, saying, ‘This is what will be in your home. This is what it will look
like. This is how the future will be,” but kind of trying to emphasize the
positive beneﬁts of change that has happened previously.’ (Aca8)
“I think climate change is scary, in part, because it’s uncertain. And how
we go about dealing with it, I don't think … Because it’s very compli-
cated, no one knows what’s gonna happen, there’s a lot of uncertainty
and risk around what, what will happen in the future. What will our
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homes look like? What will we be able to aﬀord? What will our lifestyles
be like? What will our communities look like? And this, you know, even
relates to things like, you know, more migrants from climate-change-
aﬀected areas, things like that.” (Aca8)
4.6. Quality of life: safe, clean world
Preserving or enabling a better quality of life is often associated
with cleaner air and water and less pollution, which ﬁts well within a
narrative that creates a positive vision of a (low carbon) future and
appeals to the values of many. Broader beneﬁts of the changes needed
can demonstrate the appeal of a low carbon, less polluted future whilst
highlighting social beneﬁts that accompany these changes such as a safe
and secure future to better suit the needs of individuals, families,
communities and wider aspects of people’s lives.
“Being able to go somewhere that it’s safe and clean with their children,
and to have a knowledge that the child’s future is safe… It’s really dif-
ﬁcult because the alternative is not really viable, so a non-low carbon
society is so unappealing and potentially so disastrous…” (Pract3)
“And you know, beneﬁts around other lifestyle or living type factors, so,
things like air pollution, noise.” (Pract2)
Combining this with a narrative highlighting how changes are
needed in a low carbon future, which are in fact a way of maintaining
current lifestyle standards and preferences, would enable a better sense
of what is achievable to be constructed with minimal disruption to
individuals.
“So maybe it should be framed as building, you know, as opposed to
moving away, or transitioning, it should be reinforcing, or building, or
foundation. It should be that kind of wording… Going back to that
building narrative, let’s rebuild, and regenerate, and build a better city.”
(Pract6)
“It would need to be showing how this makes the UK a more secure
country. How it’s driving the economy, how decarbonization is actually
creating economic opportunities.” (Pol6)
5. Conclusion
Research has indicated, further reinforced by the data reported
here, that engagement to climate change may increase if messages are
framed as narratives around speciﬁc themes such as those described in
this paper. This is particularly true if these narratives move away from
the data, facts and ﬁgures the public often associate with climate
change, which often form the basis of communication on the issue, and
are aimed at speciﬁc audiences who may share similar values, beliefs
and world views [30]. In addition, research suggests that the way in
which evidence assessments on climate change are put together and
disseminated do not fully align with the needs or ability of end users
[49,57] and hence narratives would oﬀer a viable mechanism through
which to do so.
In order for the UK to take advantage of opportunities associated
with a low carbon future, reliance on policy regulation alone is in-
suﬃcient and deeper engagement at the individual level is required.
Engaging people on a low carbon future is therefore vital for the UK to
reduce its greenhouse gas emissions and achieve its carbon budgets. A
variety of approaches exist in order to address this including informing
people about the risks and/or encouraging behaviour change through
policy. However, there are key issues, stemming from limits of adopting
an ‘information deﬁcit’ approach, cognitive dissonance and a need to
account for the diﬀerent values of audiences as well as various contexts
which can inﬂuence decision-making processes. It is possible to identify
key opportunities to engage people, especially those that may be
sceptical about the need for action and who may tend to be on the right
of the political spectrum.
Although climate change information is not a driver of behaviour
change, it has been found to be a powerful re-enforcer for example with
travel behaviour [58] when combined with speciﬁc information re-
levant to the individual and to contexts in which decisions are made.
This further enables connection to and salience with climate change
through which narratives can act as an important medium. For those
individuals who may remain undecided on climate change these could
more easily be reached by personal experiences of climate change [59].
Climate communication must therefore go beyond traditional linear
models of communication and aim to engage its audiences by in-
creasing deep engagement and the perceived ability to change beha-
viour whilst informing on the availability of alternative options. It is
apparent from the data reported in this paper that there is a reluctance
to adopt changes necessary for a low carbon future, or even in some
case to visualise what these changes may entail, due to a lack of tan-
gible examples and narratives of what it would look like to live in a low
carbon world, what life would look like, how people would (continue
to) prosper while adopting the changes necessary within a low carbon
future.
The research reported here outlines six possible narratives, ex-
tracted from interviews, which would be most eﬀective in framing a
low carbon future as one that is positive and desirable, and hence more
likely to engage those who are less inclined to want to change their
behaviours or lifestyle. These are: (i) showcasing investment opportu-
nities; (ii) maintaining independence and freedom of choice; (iii)
guiding audiences to visualise a low carbon future; (iv) demonstrating
broader appeal, salience and impact of not doing anything; (v) sup-
porting transitions and change; (vi) highlighting beneﬁts to quality of
life. The paper discusses the implications of these ﬁndings to public
engagement on climate change and perceptions of how life may need to
be reconﬁgured in a low carbon future. Whilst change is needed and
may be costly, framing this as an investment into one’s future may
prove beneﬁcial. This may appeal directly to people’s values and help
overcome perceived negative barriers towards the need to change
consumption patterns. A fear that emerged is that of a loss of choice and
freedom of choice. A low carbon future provides a new and diﬀerent
type of freedom, whilst maintaining independence, which in itself may
be diﬃcult to envisage or visualize in the short term. Whilst a low
carbon future in 2030 may be diﬃcult to visualize highlighting how
these may entail little rather than perceived large changes, and how
these align with existing lifestyles may further enable better engage-
ment.
Interviewees also demonstrated the view that change could also be
good, and hence should be framed appropriately in narratives, how-
ever, this is rarely considered. Interestingly, whilst visioning 2030 may
be a challenge, reﬂecting on how transitions have occurred in the past
and how individuals responded to this can be useful. Broader beneﬁts
could also demonstrate the appeal of a low carbon, less polluted future
whilst highlighting social beneﬁts such as a safe and secure future, with
better quality of life to better suit the needs of individuals, families,
communities and wider aspects of people’s lives. Demonstrating what a
high carbon world would look like could be an eﬀective method to
overcome resistance to change, if managed tactfully. Ultimately, fo-
cusing on positive visions of a low carbon future and increasing public
engagement on the issue could enable better acceptance of the need for
reconﬁguring lives.
This paper has explored how creating narratives of a low carbon
future, which is seen as positive and desirable, whilst honing identities,
values and status, is perceived by interviewees as a way to increase
engagement on the issue. By adopting a narrative approach which
translates the complexities of scientiﬁc jargon into salient frames, this
can create a common base for learning and dialogue, whilst creating the
space to connect and discuss what a low carbon future may look like
and life within it.
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